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Abstract
Since its first formulation in English, the ‘principle of normalization’ has had a profound impact on policy and practice in the
field of intellectual disability. Over the past fifty years, normalization, and Social Role Valorization, have drawn on liberal
humanist philosophy, adopting varied and complex positions in relation to it. This article will consider an apparent struc-
tural correspondence between a discourse of ‘liberal equality’ with versions of normalization that emphasised conformity
to social norms, and those drawing primarily on ‘liberal autonomy’, emphasising independence and self-determination of
people with intellectual disabilities. Despite this seeming correspondence, the article eschews a structuralist account in
favour of a discursive and rhizomatic model, in which the philosophical elements are seen as tactical forces deployed in
the pursuit of wider strategic ends. The article concludes by highlighting paradoxes in contemporary thinking that can be
traced to the legacy of normalization, specifically, the tensions between sameness, difference, equality and independence.
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1. Introduction
The principle of normalization has been identified by nu-
merous authors as the single most significant model for
policy and services in the field of intellectual disability in
the past fifty years—a fact that holds true in virtually all
English-speaking countries around the world, as well as
many others (see, for example, Caruso & Osburn, 2011;
Emerson & McGill, 1989; Keith & Keith, 2013; Kendrick,
1999; Race, 2002). Whilst not always explicitly cited in
policy and legislation, it had a significant influence on
the United Nations (1971) Declaration on the Rights of
Mentally Retarded Persons; and, in the United Kingdom,
both on the white paper, Better Services for the Mentally
Handicapped (Department of Health and Social Security,
1971) and The Report of the Committee of Enquiry into
Mental Handicap Nursing and Care (Jay, 1979), which
ushered in policies of deinstitutionalization; whilst in cur-
rent policy for people with intellectual disabilities1 (De-
partment of Health, 2001; Scottish Government, 2013),
it continues to be the implicit theoretical pivot upon
which services shifted to a non-institutional basis (John-
son, Walmsley, & Wolfe, 2010). As Mathews suggests:
[It] had a major impact on social policy in the United
Kingdomand the provision of care services to disabled
people, and can be seen as being an influential driver
in the closure of long-stay institutions and the devel-
opment of more personalised, community-based al-
ternatives. (2017, p. 1364)
Although it did set out relatively clear objectives for re-
formed policy and services, its principal target, at least
in the early years, was the institution or hospital. In
1 References to ‘persons with intellectual disability’, ‘mental retardation’ and so on, refer only to conceptual categories in which some are situated and
others not; they do not refer to any intrinsic characteristics of such individuals.
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more recent decades, in what Altermark (2017) calls the
‘post-institutional’ era, there has been a shift towards
discourses of ‘citizenship’. However, as he also notes,
these have involved transformations of power, rather
than its disappearance.
This leaves a key question for the present as to
whether normalization continues to have any relevance
or contribution to contemporary thinking in intellectual
disability policies and practices. Whilst even some sym-
pathizers (e.g. Race, 2002) have suggested that it is time
to ‘move on’ from normalization debates, by critically
examining the development of two broad approaches
to normalization and philosophy, we can see the contin-
ued value of sociological critique in unblocking stultified
thinking. Two strands, or strategies, have linked institu-
tional critiques and putatively ‘progressive’ thinking to
two different aspects of liberal humanism—equality and
autonomy—with the former being more closely aligned
with behavioural psychology, and its emphasis on adher-
ence and adaptation to behavioural norms, and the latter
more in evidence in thinking around community-based
services and the promotion of independence. Needless
to say, these are broad characterizations of approaches
that in reality exhibited far less consistency or coherence.
They were not entirely distinct approaches to normaliza-
tion, and the elements of liberal philosophy are not mu-
tually exclusive. The aim of this article is to highlight and
account for the relative balance that was given in differ-
ent texts to the two elements and to explore their con-
nection to service frameworks in order to demonstrate
the essentially tactical nature of ethical principles within
servicemodels like normalization. The hope is that, in do-
ing so, it will open up new spaces in which ethical claims
can be made and the rubric by which they can take form.
The critique will trace each of these strands in turn
and show how each connects with other, wider strate-
gies of power. It will demonstrate how these lines come
together within the discourse of normalization in appar-
ent structural correspondences. However, whilst appear-
ing to suggest a structural correlation, the article will
conclude that only a less deterministic, discursive ap-
proach can account for this association. Although the ar-
ticle draws on international literature, it is situated pri-
marily in the context of the United Kingdom, where nor-
malization and Social Role Valorization (SRV) have been
less hegemonic than elsewhere.
Whilst such an analysis cannot provide a set of so-
lutions to agreed upon problems, or even goals, there
being no such agreement or possibility thereof, it can
help to free up aspects of thinking that have be-
come sedimented and stuck. By putting the obvious
and self-evident back into play as contestable objects—
’intellectual disability’ most of all—new ways of thinking
are more likely to be opened up. So, although normal-
ization tends only to be mentioned in passing in more
recent general texts on intellectual disability policy (e.g.
Goff & Springer, 2017; Richards, Brady, & Taylor, 2015;
Sturmey & Didden, 2014), this largely reflects how its as-
sertions and values have become implicit, producing an
assumed conceptual foundation for contemporary dis-
course (Altermark, 2017). Gilbert, Cochrane and Green-
well (2005, p. 293), for example, suggest, that it “has
been transformed into a discourse of citizenship with
people with learning disabilities now managed within
specialised spaces in the community which remain su-
pervised by professionals”, whilst Corbett (2011, p. 276)
credits it with the “significant politicisation of people
with intellectual disabilities”. Nonetheless, there remain
underlying assumptions that are particularly problem-
atic because of the ways in which they can obscure the
discursive and non-discursive effects that normalization
continues to play in constituting the field of intellectual
disability: its concepts, subjectivities, interventions, and
so forth. As this article will demonstrate, it is at this
level that a historicized critique of intellectual disabil-
ity must operate, rather than dealing only with current
policies, and service theories and models. Failure to do
so will result in the continual replication of variants of
the present.
2. Liberal Equality and Behavioural Conformity
The first strand, then, is that linking the development of
the principle of normalization as a loose and sometimes
contradictory discourse and operant conditioning, in par-
ticular, the way in which the former was used as an in-
strument of the latter—observations ofmutual reinforce-
ment and contradiction notwithstanding (e.g. Emerson
& McGill, 1989). As Clarke and Clarke (1974, p. 7) sug-
gested, behavioural techniques for the teaching of social
and employment skills “were [later] termed ‘normaliza-
tion’”, whilst Schalock (2004) observed that the develop-
ment of adaptive behaviour was ‘integral’ to principles
of normalization. Normalization also served as a tactical
weapon for psychology against medically oriented insti-
tutions in favour of community facilities, which, at least
in theory, had a more developmental orientation, even
if the realities of deinstitutionalisation didn’t always ac-
cord with these aims (Felce, 1996; Flynn, 1980). When
normalization took root in North America, the force of
the human rights argument was largely rooted in a cer-
tain tradition of human rights which existed in the USA—
broadly Lockean in orientation—as well as to a specific
period when that tradition received particular political
emphasis (see, for example, Wolfensberger, 1971). Not
only was it a time when there was a general critique of
institutions and institutionalisation (Goffman, 1961), but
it was also one that witnessed anti-Vietnamwar protests
and civil rights unrest. One typical ideological strategy
employed for the political advancement of normalization
was to appeal to the common humanity between ‘peo-
ple with mental retardation’—and this word was itself
emphasized—and others, with a corresponding attack
on the ‘de-humanizing’ institutions and practices therein.
Central to arguments for normalization was the recog-
nition of “a claim to humanity which they share with
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the non-handicapped” (Ryan & Thomas, 1987, p. 130),
though, as Wolfensberger (1980) made clear, it would
be mistaken to draw a simple equation between the two.
Normalization may depend on humanization, but the lat-
ter does not necessarily lead to, or imply commitment to,
the former.
The specific philosophical construction of person-
hood for the ‘retarded’ individual was not by any means
unique to the issue of retardation. Nonetheless, there
is ample evidence of this shifting view being tactically
significant for an empiricist psychology in defining the
personhood of the retarded individual. This was partic-
ularly true in the ways in which it further dichotomised
soul and body, alienating consciousness from behaviour.
Gold (1980, p. 19) illustrated this pointwith his insistence
that trainers focused on tasks and behaviour as opposed
to “feelings”, which would constitute “manipulation”. As
Foucault (1979) observed, the deployment of the soul as
human essence was fundamental to the coexistence of
the empirical sciences of human behaviour, with human-
ist politics and ethics. Foucault describes its function as
a ‘reality reference’, upon which, through the medium of
the body:
Various concepts have been constructed and domains
of analysis carried out: psyche, subjectivity, personal-
ity, consciousness etc.: on it have been built scientific
techniques and discourses, and the moral claims of
humanism. (Foucault, 1979, pp. 29–30)
For the principle of normalization, the key function, or
effect, of the soul was to establish a commonality and
equality between those deemed to be and not to be ‘re-
tarded’. In addition, it depended upon a specific relation-
ship between the retarded person, his or her body, and
the observing gaze of the psychologist.
Of the various key components that make up liberal
humanist philosophy, that of ‘liberal equality’—equality
before the law, equality of opportunity, as citizens in
a democratic polity, etc.—was particularly significant in
this strand of normalization. As already noted, the claims
of normalization against the dehumanizing institution
were invariably underpinned by assertions of this com-
mon humanity. The role of psychologywas, perhaps, sub-
tler, though arguably much more profound in forming
the conditions of emergence for normalization (Simpson,
1998). Whilst at pains to say, unconvincingly to critics
(see e.g. Brown& Smith, 1989; Perrin &Nirje, 1985), that
“the goal [of normalization] is not to impose social confor-
mity”, it was, nonetheless, “to prevent or reverse invol-
untary or unconscious deviancy” (Wolfensberger, 1970,
p. 68; see also, Wolfensberger, 1972). Behaviourism in-
troduced another form of normalization, viz. the nor-
malizing actions of disciplinary power. Thus, there were,
“two…basic variables that can be manipulated for the
client’s benefit: his environment and, as a result of the
manipulation of his environment, his behavior” (Meyer-
son, Kerr, & Michael, 1974, p. 377).
In this way, behaviour was reduced to the level of
a ‘variable’, subject to expert scrutiny and control, the
aim of which was to produce social integration through
behaviour change—though also attitudinal and service
changes. In turn, the separation and bracketing of the
‘ethical’ created a distinctive hierarchy of need. Thus,
skills of money use or the prevention of shrieking in pub-
lic were deemed to be more important on the scien-
tific curriculum than the creation or appreciation of art.
As Wolfensberger and Thomas (2007, p. 283) suggested,
competence development should be directed towards
the enhancement of creating and sustaining valued so-
cial roles, not with “competency for its own sake”. Con-
sequently, the ‘mentally retarded’ subject became an
increasingly complex and managed space characterized
by the containment of responsibility and self-direction,
within an encompassing space of irresponsibility and
alienated will.
Although often downplayed in relation to other fac-
tors, such as the putatively sociological basis of normal-
ization (Wolfensberger, 1970, 1972, 1975), the impact of
developments in psychology in the post-war period were
highly significant for the emergence of normalization. At
the same time, the picture was a complex one and Par-
menter (2004) documents theways in which behavioural
psychology drove andwas driven by the demands of non-
institutional models of service provision. Behavioural re-
search demonstrated what could be achieved in terms
of the acquisition of social skills (Francey, 1960; Tizard,
1964) and employment skills (O’Connor & Tizard, 1956),
as well as the reduction in ‘maladaptive’ behaviours
(Beier, 1964), and a wide range of other aspects of learn-
ing and behaviour through operant conditioning (Denny,
1964). As Yates, Dyson and Hiles (2008) note, the indi-
vidual tended to become obscured within normalization,
which reduced its targets merely to functions of the so-
cial. This problem, they argue, is borne precisely out of ir-
reconcilable tensions between the humanism of normal-
ization, an essentialist view of impairment and the fail-
ure to conceive of the subject as an effect of power and
knowledge. These problems are evident also in the sec-
ond broad tradition of normalization, considered next.
3. Liberal Autonomy and the Self-Directed Life
Running through the dominant discourse of normaliza-
tion, then, was a thread of similitude that linked together
the scientific pedagogy of behaviourism and the ideol-
ogy of liberal equality: a behavioural, disciplinary nor-
mality, and a shared human identity. However, although
Wolfensberger’s approach, or, rather, approaches, may
have dominated the field, theoretically at least, they
were by nomeans the only ones. The apparent structural
correspondence between liberal humanism and strate-
gies of governance can also be found in another strand
of normalization. In this instance, the broad correlation
is between an ideological base drawing principally on lib-
eral autonomy and a service strategy aimed at maximiz-
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ing choice and independence. Here the common thread
is quite different, rather than commonality between peo-
ple, it emphasizes human individuality and uniqueness
via human rights and autonomy. Although normalization
was not centrally about ‘rights’ (Wolfensberger, 2002),
the discourse of ‘rights’ was very much in evidence from
the outset of the normalization’s development. Bank-
Mikkelsen (1964) identified the recognition of the full
and equal rights of citizenship for the people with in-
tellectual disabilities as central to the pioneering devel-
opments in Denmark that first introduced the principle
of normalization.
Several factors contributed to the fracturing of the
relative theoretical homogeneity that normalization en-
joyed in the 1970s. One of these was the widespread co-
option of deinstitutionalisation into government policy
in Western and Northern Europe, North America, and
Australasia. In many of these cases, the policies, often
under a general rubric of ‘community care’, aimed at
maximizing choice and independence, most especially
in countries and states where neo-liberal social policies
were beginning to be pursued. Nirje (1969, 1972) had ar-
gued from the outset that the right to make or influence
choices affecting one’s life was fundamental to the prin-
ciple of normalization at both an individual and collec-
tive level.
They know what they are talking about, and they
know that they are describing the realities of their
existence….They are acting as citizens with the same
right to be respected as others. (Nirje, 1972, p. 189)
The UK government policy framework of ‘community
care’, or the service model of ‘an ordinary life’ (King’s
Fund, 1980, 1984) provide good examples of the empha-
sis on independence, both in the sense of self-reliance,
i.e. of individuals, families and communities, and self-
determination. In this formulation, ‘normal’ played a
much more straightforward function as the creation of
services that allowed for lives as ordinary, unfettered and
self-determined as possible (e.g. Towell, 1988). As with
Nirje (1972), the key role of service users as experts on
their own circumstances and needs was central (Gather-
cole, 1988). From the perspective of public authorities
providing and commissioning social services, the promo-
tion of independencewas also frequently linked to reduc-
tion in public support.
This conceptual approach emphasised the individ-
ual and his or her right to self-determination. Here,
a typically more politicised approach both celebrated
difference whilst also challenging the oppression re-
lated to it (see e.g. Szivos & Travers, 1988). Confronting
the alleged emphasis on conformity to dominant social
norms—white, masculine, middle class—Szivos asked:
“Why should people [with intellectual disabilities] not be
allowed to feel positively about what is unique about
them?” (1991, p. 29, emphasis added)
By contrast, the normalizing pedagogy of the psy-
chological strand exhibited a tendency to over-ride self-
determination wherever it resulted in decisions and op-
tions that might not be the most ‘socially valued’—
most especially after Wolfensberger’s (1983) concep-
tual reorientation towards SRV, which resulted in an
even greater ambivalence towards the whole question
of personal choice (see e.g. Wolfensberger, 2002). For
Wolfensberger and Thomas (2007), the exercise of one’s
rights was firmly subordinated to cultural normativity
and adaptive competence for deviant and devalued per-
sons, rather than placing rights and choice at the cen-
tre, as Mathews (2017) suggested it did. Services were
expected to implement support for rights in ways that
developed “adaptive personal autonomy…[in] culturally
appropriate and valued [ways, for the]…responsible ex-
ercise of their rights” (Wolfensberger & Thomas, 2007, p.
225, emphasis in original). The exercise of personal au-
tonomy in ways that were ‘maladaptive’ was to be “gov-
erned by discipline, self-control, and a sense of responsi-
bility” (Wolfensberger & Thomas, 2007, p. 225).
4. Normalization and Ideology: Structure and
Discourse
As noted, there were sharp points of disjuncture in
Wolfensberger’s own work, most notably with the shift
to SRV—cementing his focus on creating and maintain-
ing valued social roles as the key to protecting deval-
ued social groups from exclusion and harm—and times
when threads came together only to part later, highlight-
ing the need not to become concerned with authorial
biographies and oeuvres (Foucault, 1972). Rather than
attend to the evolution of any particular author’s think-
ing, I have tried to present an apparent structural cor-
respondence between certain strategies of power and
ideological formations in the discourse on normaliza-
tion. Specifically, one based on commonality (‘human
essence’ as an ideology underpinning the strategy of ‘be-
havioural competence’), and another based on individu-
ality (with ‘liberal autonomy’ serving as the ideological
basis for ‘independence’).
There is a certain attractive neatness to a struc-
tural account for these correspondences.What is lacking,
however, is any apparent mechanism or structure of cau-
sation. Without recourse to the founding subject—there
being no reason for supposing that authors are individ-
ually, and simultaneously, engaged in a conscious tacti-
cal appropriation of ideological elements solely in pur-
suance of larger power strategies—there is a hiatus in
the accounting for any determination. More widely, this
was, of course, one of the principal reasons for the gen-
eral demise of structuralist theory (Nayar, 2014).
Post-structural approaches, with the general empha-
sis on ‘discourse’, understood as constitutive, though not
determining, of subject positions (Sullivan, 2005), seem
more promising analytically. In a study of the life sci-
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ences, Valle (1997) suggests three dimensions for the
analysis of discourses:
(i) the subject matter of the texts and their general
rhetorical structure; (ii) the implicit or explicit ‘recipi-
ent’ or addressee of the text; and (iii) the presence or
absence of an explicit text ‘motivation’, i.e. statement
of purpose. (Valle, 1997, p. 79)
All three of these elements can be observed in this study
of normalization and liberal philosophy. The analysis has
rested on the study of the elements and structure of
the discourse, and it is from here that the central prob-
lematic has arisen. In the second and third place, sev-
eral implicit—and sometimes quite explicit—target audi-
ences and objectives can be discerned, particularly relat-
ing to the general anti-medical, anti-institutional agenda.
However, as the analysis has shown, themotivations and
addressees are multiple, highly layered and inconsistent.
In addition, the second and third components, like Kuh-
nian theory of scientific development (Kuhn, 1996), lead
this approach to lapse into a form of collective psychol-
ogy based around inter-subjective agreement on truth
and meaning (Gutting, 1989). A Foucauldian approach,
however, more thoroughly excludes the action of the
subject from the analysis:
The rules of discourse are not rules which individuals
consciously follow….Indeed, the place, function and
character of the ‘knowers’, authors and audiences of a
discourse are also a function of these discursive rules.
(Philp, 1990, p. 69)
In addition, this approach allows for the generalised
account given here, whilst also accounting for the, of-
ten significant, exceptions to the correspondences sug-
gested. Foucault (1981, p. 100) notes that elements and
bodies of discourse circulate with “tactical polyvalence”,
pressed into service first for one, then for another strat-
egy of power, sometimes simultaneously for two contra-
dictory ones. Equally, two apparently exclusive elements
may be held in tension within the one power-knowledge
complex. For this reason, we must also avoid the ap-
proaches based merely on the play of binaries.
The principle of normalization was simultaneously: a
concept, or series of concepts; a wider discursive field;
and a technology of power. Little wonder then that its
proponents so often felt compelled to correct the per-
ceived errors of others in interpreting or applying it: aca-
demics, professionals, policy makers and one another
(e.g. Emerson, 1990; Nirje, 1992; O’Brien, 1981; Per-
rin & Nirje, 1985; Wolfensberger, 1980, 2002), or, as
Caruso and Osburn (2011, p. 194) put it, “safeguarding
against…degradation”. Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988) fig-
ure of the ‘rhizome’ provides a useful analogy here. Like
the rhizomatic tuber, normalization proliferated beyond
the control of its designers, mutating and altering its
growth to changing conditions. There was never a single
point or strand that could be called the ‘true’ or ‘essen-
tial’ one, not even in a founding sense—perhaps most
of all in a founding sense—to which we might return or
aspire. Furthermore, as Shildrick and Price (2006) note,
the rhizomatic proliferation of knowledge is not some-
thing to be wary of or disappointed in. At worst, there
is an inevitability to its steady operations, and, in fact, it
constantly opens up new inclusive opportunities for such
developments, particularly at the micro-level. Goodley
(2007; see also Fisher & Goodley, 2007), for example,
has shown how ‘rhizomatic’ counter-narratives from the
mothers of disabled babies have helped produce ‘shelter’
and resistance from dominant ones, as well as leading
new forms of subjectivities.
Whilst here is not the place to develop a fully-fledged
account of normalization as rhizomatic, there are a num-
ber of points to be made—following Buchanan’s (2007)
reading of the concept—none of which imply or re-
quire wholehearted support for the Deleuzo-Guattarian
project. Firstly, the various iterations and uses of normal-
ization that we have considered (and all the others be-
sides) interconnect, though we must eschew the temp-
tation to order them hierarchically and claim that any
are more ‘true’, ‘accurate’ or possibly even ‘helpful’. Sec-
ondly, and following from the first point, they are all
facets of a whole that is simultaneously not a unity;
“it is composed of dimensions…not units” (Buchanan,
2007). Thirdly, the proliferation of the rhizome is not ‘re-
productive’, in the fashion of Wolfensberger’s approach;
instead, its growth is chaotic, unpredictable, genera-
tive of mutation and offshoots. Fourthly, it is an “in-
finitely modifiable map” (Buchanan, 2007), highlighting
the fact that normalization, through ongoing critique,
contains infinite future potentialities and directions of
travel. Fifthly, the rhizome lacks any fixed centre or rul-
ing signifier, which is whyWolfensberger’s efforts at con-
ceptual containment continually failed. Lastly, Buchanan
(2007) notes that the rhizome is not “amenable to any
structural or generative model”; normalization, in other
words, is not a ‘thing’ that exists to be understood, clar-
ified and refined. It is constantly being brought into be-
ing, and in ever new ways, with and through discourse
and practice.
Some of the signs of this rhizomatic (re)generation
are evident throughout this article. The institution pro-
vided a common focus and the conditions conducive to
the deployment of a discourse of common humanity. In
the post-institutional context, the field is fragmenting—
the normative strategy has intensified, whilst new strate-
gies have emerged, predicated on the new relations of
power: choice, individual service planning, risk manage-
ment. This does not, however, imply that discourse, even
in its strictly ideological functions, is subservient to the
actions of a sovereign power. Instead, this article high-
lights the way in which both liberal humanism and nor-
malization deploy and are deployed, for reasons of tacti-
cal expediency, in “a multiple and mobile field of force
relations, wherein far-reaching, but never completely
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stable, effects of domination are produced” (Foucault,
1981, p. 102).
The elements of philosophy explored in this article
do, however, also perform an ideological function, in the
sense that they play a legitimating role for certain prac-
tices and policies. They do not provide a foundational
value base on which normalization can be said to rest,
but neither are they ideological in the structuralist sense
of that term; there is no structural determination in ev-
idence, they have no intrinsic, singular or static connec-
tion to normalization, and have no fixed orientation or
value. They signify a much more complex pattern of mu-
tual induction, transformation and deployment of power
and knowledge over a constantly shifting terrain.
5. Conclusion
This article has implications for common assumptions
that the outcome of ethical contests is, or at least ought
to be, primary and determining in shaping the life op-
portunities, the social and ethical position of people
with intellectual disabilities, and what that might even
mean (see, among others, Kittay & Carlson, 2010; Rogers,
2016). Goodey (2011, 2016), by contrast, has argued
that the relationship between ethics and social practices
shaping ‘intellectual disability’ have been far more com-
plex and contradictory throughout history in ways that
are not reducible to matters of progress. Indeed, one
might be tempted to wonder whether Kittay and Carl-
son’s (2010) eponymous debate around Cognitive Dis-
ability and its Challenge to Moral Philosophy might not
more accurately be reversed.
The consequences of such a study for SRV, and its ac-
companying service assessment tool, PASSING, are that
any further attempts to purify, define and control the
concept, its dissemination and application, would be seri-
ouslymisguided. One of the key features of the shift from
normalization to SRV, was an increasing emphasis on the
nature of the concept as empirically verifiable, objective
and essentially value free; the underpinning assumption
being that SRV was itself subject to ‘higher order’ ‘supra-
empirical’ principles and values which give the system
and its outcomes meaning (Thomas & Wolfensberger,
1999). SRV, it is suggested, should be restricted to the
domain of empiricism, ‘What works?’, and anything else
is ‘religion’ (Thomas & Wolfensberger, 1999); SRV itself
“does not prescribe” (Wolfensberger, 2002, p. 253).
However, such a position has resulted in a certain
vacillation because its proponents regard social norms
and mores as both a resource for the process of val-
orization, as well as the primary sources of oppression
(e.g. Wolfensberger, 1995). SRV reveals itself as an ac-
tively functioning system for the deployment of values,
and as much more than just passively subject to the ac-
tions of ideological meta-narratives. More significantly,
there can be no appeal to such ‘supra-empirical’ prin-
ciples, since the fact-value divide on which such a sup-
position rests cannot be sustained. The ideological sys-
tems deployed in the various iterations of normalization
have been shown to have been levelled to the same shift-
ing terrain of power-knowledge relations as the concepts
they are purported to govern. The reconceptualization
of normalization as SRV did nothing to overcome this. In-
deed, claims to a quasi-scientific neutrality themselves
carry an ideological paradox: Critics’ very attempts to
raise objections on ideological grounds are dismissed as
fundamentally misguided on the grounds that SRV pro-
vides no guide to what ought to be done (Wolfensberger,
2002), and yet, it is surely spurious to maintain that SRV
is in fact neutral about what is to be done. The mere fact
of determining what is and is not directly relevant to the
measurement of social value is itself amatter of value, as
are the mechanisms of definition and relative weighting.
Returning to Yates et al. (2008), it is important to note
also that neither normalization nor SRVhave resolved the
paradoxical relationship between the implied concept of
the liberal subject, and the intellectually disabled sub-
ject’s actual status as produced by various lines of force
(see also, Simpson, 2017). The outcome of this paradox,
they contend, is the, again implicit, although necessary,
silencing of the impairment, ‘intellectual disability’, as a
concept itself, leading to further conceptual confusion.
Altermark (2017) also tries to problematize this subject
position by recasting the recent historiography of intel-
lectual disability. However, he does so in a way that intro-
duces different kinds of historical simplifications to those
he attempts to critique. Following Foucault’s lead, Alter-
mark objects to analyses of power that constantly privi-
lege the state, but he himself situates historical periods—
overly monolithically—in terms of government policies.
As we have seen here, the initial developments in nor-
malization and deinstitutionalization had little to do with
the state per se, beginning at a more micro and intersti-
tial level with developments in operant conditioning.
Other tensions and conflicts are also apparent in the
maintenance of SRV, for instance, in the way in which
it evinces an ongoing difficulty in adopting or aligning it-
self with a clear system of rights. In their book on ethics
and intellectual disability, for instance, Keith and Keith
(2013) conclude with a section, commending SRV as the
way forward, that is devoid of reference to rights and
ethical theory. Also, whilst Caruso and Osburn (2011)
were insistent on the need to keep ‘best practice’ within
the tightly regulated framework of SRV, Shevellar, Sher-
win and Mackay (2012), struggle to marry the top-down
enforced singular model of SRV with the principles of
adult education, with its participative and experiential,
bottom-up approach.Whilst wishing to ground SRV train-
ing in experiential learning and reflection, they do not
anticipate and address the kind of proliferation of per-
spectives that Wolfensberger and those carrying on his
legacy were so keen to avoid. They do, however, note
the inability of SRV to halt the development of oppres-
sive institutions now flourishing in the community.
This critique problematizes two implicit paradoxes
that were evident in the two approaches to normaliza-
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tion and that continue to be very much in evidence to-
day. The first derives from the professional and concep-
tual manoeuvring by psychology; it is the underlying as-
sumption that the different must be made to appear the
same. Indeed, as Simpson (2014) contends, it is the very
failure of mechanisms of socialisation to inculcate disci-
plinary self-regulation that is constitutive of intellectual
disability itself. Consequently, interventions typically in-
volve the external imposition of what would normally be
acquired and assumed. The second paradox, perhaps the
more significant one, can be traced directly to the second
tradition of normalization, viz. the unstable and logically
incoherent claim of different but equal. The basis of any
putative categorical difference here can only essential-
ize intellectual disability. However, doing so undermines
any real basis for commensurability within liberal human-
ism. This paradoxwas captured, without irony, in the title
of an earlier policy framework published by the Scottish
Executive, The Same as You? (2000). The title, posed as
a question, both implies a difference—about which the
question is being asked—whilst enquiring as to whether
that difference is the same.
Given these warnings, the advancement of a progres-
sive politics for and with people with intellectual disabil-
ities must not imply unequivocal adherence to a partic-
ular model, or even an objective. Not simply because
these are never arrived at, but because the relations of
power and the constitutive bodies of knowledge are con-
stantly shifting. As Shildrick (1997) notes:
The yearning for the certainty of absolutes has re-
sulted historically not in justice or equality or liberty,
but in the denial of moral personhood to all those cat-
egories of living beings who cannot be identified in
terms of the ideal standard. But once the binary of
ideal/non-ideal has been displaced, once it is acknowl-
edged that full and final definition is always deferred,
it becomes possible to seek new constructions which
no longer operate on the basis of exclusion. (Shildrick,
1997, pp. 212–213)
Although, as we have seen, new constructions, whatever
form they take, can shift quite easily from being instru-
ments of liberation to ones of oppression. The never-
ending attempt to fix and govern a theory, such as SRV,
inevitably causes us to lose sight of how fundamentally
the field has changed and, therefore, the strategic pos-
sibilities of SRV itself. Paradoxically, this change is very
much due to the effects of normalization itself, albeit not
always in foreseen or planned ways. That is not to say,
as some have done (Race, 2002), that there is no longer
any purpose to be served in studying normalization, and
that only SRV and associated concepts should be consid-
ered. Indeed, rhizomatic proliferation is not the reason
why normalization should be ignored, it is what presents
public policy with the possibility of radically new options
and directions.
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